

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04323 01 OF 03 211856Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----074029 211900Z /43
O 211800Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7471
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 04323

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: US PLENARY STATEMENT,
MARCH 21

CTB MESSAGE NO. 184

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PLENARY STATEMENT BY AMB. PAUL C.
WARNKE ON MARCH 21, 1978. BEGIN TEXT:

TODAY BEFORE WE RETURN TO OUR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS FOR
WHAT I AM SURE WILL BE AN INTENSIVE PERIOD OF STUDY AND
PREPARATION, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SOME THOUGHTS OF OUR
DELEGATION ON CERTAIN KEY ISSUES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

I WOULD LIKE TO TURN FIRST TO THE CONTENTS OF THE
SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. AS MR. EDMONDS SAID,
THIS IS THE AREA THAT HAS TAKEN THE LION'S SHARE OF OUR
ATTENTION HERE. AT THE LAST PLENARY MEETING ON MARCH 15,
DR. MOROKHOV PROVIDED US WITH AN ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04323 01 OF 03 211856Z

CONTAINING LANGUAGE FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. WE ARE
MOST GRATEFUL FOR THIS CONTRIBUTION. THE SOVIET WORKING
PAPER INDICATES THAT THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE
THE VIEWS OF OUR THREE DELEGATIONS ALREADY CONVERGE, AND
SOME ADDITIONAL AREAS WHERE WE SHOULD BE ABLE, WITHOUT
MUCH DIFFICULTY, TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULATIONS.
HOWEVER, IT ALSO INDICATES THAT THERE REMAIN SOME CRITICAL

DIFFERENCES IN THE CURRENT POSITIONS OF OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS. I WON'T COMMENT IN DETAIL TODAY ON THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, AS I'VE INDICATED, THERE ARE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PARTS WHERE VIEWS ARE CONGRUENT. I WOULD LIKE TO IDENTIFY KEY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO INDICATE BRIEFLY MY GOVERNMENT'S THINKING ON THESE PROBLEMS.

ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS, THE SOVIET WORKING PAPER PROVIDES FOR TURNING OVER TO THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS ON PRACTICALLY ALL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE STATIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT TO TRY TO AGREE IN THE FUTURE, AFTER THE TREATY HAS ENTERED INTO FORCE. I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT ENTER INTO THE TREATY WITHOUT HAVING A CLEAR PICTURE IN ADVANCE OF THE AGREED REQUIREMENTS THAT THE INTERNAL STATIONS WOULD HAVE TO MEET. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE EXPLICIT AGREEMENT IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT ON KEY VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES, SUCH AS THE NUMBER AND GENERAL LOCATION OF STATIONS, GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLATION, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT, THE GENERAL QUALITY OF THE EQUIPMENT, AND PROVISIONS TO ENSURE THE TIMELY RECEIPT OF ADEQUATELY AUTHENTICATED DATA.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04323 01 OF 03 211856Z

I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT ONE BASIC OBJECTIVE REGARDING THE NATURE AND VOLUME OF THE DATA TO BE EXCHANGED. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT AN APPROACH PERMITTING DATA FROM THE INTERNAL STATIONS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ONLY UPON REQUEST FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFYING THE NATURE OF EVENTS ALREADY DETECTED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. INSTEAD, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR US, AND I AM SURE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, THAT ALL OF THE SEISMIC DATA RECORDED AT THE STATIONS BE PROVIDED ON A SMOOTHLY FUNCTIONING, ROUTINE BASIS.

WITH KEY TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ADVANCED INTERNAL STATIONS, AS WELL AS TARGET DATES FOR THEIR INSTALLATION BOTH EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, WE COULD AGREE THAT THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION. AND WE WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN ENTRY INTO FORCE AND THE TIME THAT ADVANCED INTERNAL STATIONS BECAME AVAILABLE.

ON THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES FOR INITIATING ON-SITE

INSPECTIONS, I BELIEVE THAT, DESPITE ALL THE DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD THIS ROUND, OUR POSITIONS ARE ACTUALLY VERY SIMILAR, AND THAT WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULATIONS. ONE KEY TO SOLVING THIS PROBLEM IS TO FIND LANGUAGE INDICATING CLEARLY THAT THE ONLY TYPE OF EVENT THAT COULD LEGITIMATELY GIVE RISE TO REQUESTS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS IS A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE TREATY--THAT IS, A POSSIBLE UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID LANGUAGE, SUCH AS THE TERM "SEISMIC

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04323 02 OF 03 211909Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W
-----074159 211915Z /40

O 211800Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7472
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 GENEVA 04323

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

EVENT", WHICH MAKES IT UNCLEAR WHETHER WE ARE TALKING MERELY ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE EVENT OR ALSO THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED.

WE ALSO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN SEEKING TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, TO HAVE A STRAIGHTFORWARD STATEMENT IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THE PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THE EVENT IN QUESTION WAS AN UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

ANOTHER KEY ISSUE INVOLVES THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE SUBMITTED IN MAKING AN ON-SITE INSPECTION REQUEST. MY DELEGATION BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT A FORMULATION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF ANY PARTICULAR TYPE OF EVIDENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS, IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING

UNSUBSTANTIATED REQUESTS, TO LIMIT THE TYPE OF EVIDENCE
THAT COULD BE SUBMITTED TO SEISMIC EVIDENCE OR OTHER
EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL PHENOMENA THAT COULD HAVE BEEN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04323 02 OF 03 211909Z

ASSOCIATED WITH A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION.

FINALLY, WE WISH TO REITERATE THAT OUR AGREED UNDER-
STANDING CONCERNING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ARBITRARINESS,
EITHER IN REQUESTING OR RESPONDING TO ON-SITE INSPECTION
REQUESTS, IS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF OUR APPROACH TO
VOLUNTARY INSPECTIONS. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WOULD NOT
BE INTENDED TO CLARIFY OR INTERPRET PROVISIONS THAT ARE
NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRECISE IN THE TEXT. INSTEAD, IT
EXPRESSES OUR COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE PLAN TO ACT
UNDER THE TREATY. WE SHOULD BEGIN DISCUSSING THE TEXT
OF THE UNDERSTANDING AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE NEGOTIATE
LANGUAGE FOR THE AGREEMENT.

ON THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES FOR CARRYING OUT ON-SITE
INSPECTIONS, THE TREATMENT OF THIS ISSUE IN THE SOVIET
WORKING PAPER DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT THE CONCEPT
THAT RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL SHOULD
BE ESTABLISHED IN ADVANCE AND PROVIDED FOR IN DETAIL IN
THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT. THIS IS A CONCEPT ON WHICH
WE APPEARED TO BE IN AGREEMENT ON NOVEMBER 2. THE SOVIET
WORKING PAPER SPECIFIES CERTAIN RIGHTS, BUT DOES NOT
INDICATE, IN TERMS OF AUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT AND INSPECTION
TECHNIQUES, HOW THOSE GENERAL RIGHTS COULD BE EXERCISED.

IN ADDITION, THE SOVIET WORKING PAPER PROVIDES THAT
A NUMBER OF KEY FEATURES OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS, SUCH AS
EQUIPMENT, NUMBER OF PERSONNEL, AND DURATION, WOULD BE
LEFT COMPLETELY TO DETERMINATION BY THE JOINT CONSULTA-
TIVE COMMISSION, RATHER THAN SPECIFIED IN THE SEPARATE
AGREEMENT. HERE AGAIN, WE CANNOT SIMPLY AGREE NOW TO
TRY TO AGREE LATER. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT NOT
ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT WE HAVE LISTED IN OUR ILLUSTRA-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04323 02 OF 03 211909Z

TIVE TEXT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN EACH CIRCUMSTANCE. BUT
THERE SHOULD BE A RIGHT TO USE SUCH EQUIPMENT EVEN IF
IN PRACTICE THAT RIGHT WOULD NOT ALWAYS BE FULLY EXER-
CISED. IT WOULD BE MUCH LESS PRACTICAL AND MORE BOTHER-
SOME TO TRY TO AGREE ON EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT ON AN
AD HOC BASIS. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROCEDURES

THAT COULD ASSURE THE HOST PARTY THAT INSPECTION EQUIPMENT WOULD SERVE ONLY AUTHORIZED PURPOSES.

I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE WITH A FEW REMARKS CONCERNING THE QUESTIONS OF DURATION OF THE WEAPONS TEST BAN TREATY AND OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DURATION OF THE TREATY AND THAT OF THE MORATORIUM ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. MY GOVERNMENT'S ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS ON THESE QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS DURING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, MOST RECENTLY IN MY PLENARY STATEMENT OF MARCH 7. THEY ARE, FIRST, A STABLE AND DURABLE TREATY THAT CAN CONTINUE WITHOUT THE ADHERENCE OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS AND, SECOND, A MORATORIUM ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS THAT REMAINS IN FORCE AS LONG AS THE BAN ON WEAPONS TESTS, UNLESS IT IS REPLACED EARLIER BY A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF CARRYING OUT THOSE EXPLOSIONS.

THE PROPOSALS THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATIONS HAVE PUT FORWARD MEET THESE CRITICAL TESTS. THOSE ADVANCED BY THE SOVIET UNION ON NOVEMBER 2 CLEARLY DO NOT. AND NO NEW PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN ADVANCED FORMALLY BY THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THAT DATE. MY DELEGATION ONCE AGAIN CALLS ON OUR SOVIET PARTNERS TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THESE CRUCIAL ISSUES DURING OUR UPCOMING RECESS, AND TO RETURN TO GENEVA IN APRIL PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH US REALISTIC AND WORKABLE SOLUTIONS THAT MEET THE OBJECTIVES I HAVE OUTLINED.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04323 03 OF 03 211907Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 ACDE-00 DOEE-00 /026 W

-----074138 211909Z /40

O 211800Z MAR 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7473

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 GENEVA 04323

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

THE LAST MORE THAN EIGHT WEEKS HAVE BEEN ACTIVE
ONES FOR ALL OF US. WE HAVE HELD VERY SERIOUS AND,
INDEED, FRANK DISCUSSIONS ON ISSUES OF THE HIGHEST IMPOR-
TANCE AND SENSITIVITY TO ALL OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. MOST
IMPORTANTLY, WE FEEL THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS WELL
UNDER WAY. WHILE OUR RATE OF PROGRESS SO FAR IS WORKING
OUT AGREED LANGUAGE HAS NOT BEEN AS RAPID AS WE ALL
WOULD HAVE HOPED, MY DELEGATION NONETHELESS BELIEVES WE
HAVE MADE A GOOD START, AND LOOKS FORWARD TO INTENSIFIED
AND PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN WE RESUME OUR WORK NEXT
MONTH. AND, MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, WE HAVE BEEN ENCOUR-
AGED BY THE DEMONSTRATION DURING THESE EIGHT WEEKS OF
THE STRONG AND SINCERE INTEREST OF ALL OF OUR GOVERNMENTS
IN ACHIEVING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. END TEXT. WARNKE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA04323
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780124-0882
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780340/aaaabhrz.tel
Line Count: 294
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 961a61c0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3248918
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: US PLENARY STATEMENT, MARCH 21 CTB MESSAGE NO. 184
TAGS: PARM, US, UK, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/961a61c0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014